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Existence of an Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy
with Indivisibilities and Money1
Gerard van der Laan2, Dolf Talman3 and Zaifu Yang4
Abstract In this paper we introduce a model of an exchange economy
with indivisible goods and money. There are nitely many agents each of
whom owns one unit of each of nitely many dierent types of indivisible
goods and certain amount of money. Each type of indivisible good is
subject to quality dierentiation. We demonstrate that under fairly
mild conditions on demand the economy has a price equilibrium. The
proof is based on a generalization of the well-known lemma of Knaster,
Kuratowski and Mazurkiewicz (KKM) in combinatorial topology. The
results in the paper generalize those of Gale in case of just one indivisible
good present in the economy.
Keywords: Indivisibilities, equilibria, combinatorial lemmas.
1 Introduction
Since the publication of the seminal article of Gale and Shapley (1962) economic
models with one indivisible good have been intensively studied by a lot of re-
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searchers, e.g., Shapley and Shubik (1972), Shapley and Scarf (1974), Kelso and
Crawford (1982), Kaneko (1982), Quinzii (1984), Gale (1984), Kaneko and Ya-
mamoto (1986), and Yamamoto (1987). Gale and Shapley (1962) considered a
marriage market with two types of agents: men and women. Each man has pref-
erences over women and each woman has preferences over men. Gale and Shapley
studied this market from a game-theoretic point of view and demonstrated that
there exists a stable matching. This model was generalized by Kelso and Craw-
ford (1982) as a job matching model by allowing the presence of money. In the
models presented by Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Kaneko (1982), there are two
types of agents: sellers and buyers, and an indivisible good is traded for money.
These models are asymmetric in the sense that sellers and buyers play completely
dierent roles. Shapley and Scarf (1974) gave a similar but symmetric model, in
which agents exchange their indivisible good without using money. Quinzii (1984)
proposed a symmetric model which permits the presence of money and unies the
models above. She proved that the associated cooperative game has a nonempty
core and that the associated market has a competitive equilibrium under several
conditions on the utility functions of the agents. Gale (1984) made assumptions di-
rectly on demands instead of on the utility functions and proposed an elegant proof
of the existence of a competitive equilibrium. The proof is based on an intersec-
tion lemma, which is a generalization of the KKM lemma. Kaneko and Yamamoto
(1986) considered an asymmetric model in which sellers and buyers trade one in-
divisible good for money. They proved the existence of a competitive equilibrium
by using a xed point argument. In Yamamoto (1987) the model of Kaneko and
Yamamoto is extended by allowing agents initially to own more than one unit of
an indivisible good and making no dierence among sellers and buyers. He showed
by means of an ingenious argument that the market has a competitive equilibrium
under some conditions on the utility functions of the agents. The crucial assump-
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tion of all these models is that there is only one indivisible good and each agent
demands no more than one unit of the indivisible good. Typically, we may think of
the indivisible good as houses which all have the same function for agents but may
be dierent in quality.
Until now, little progress has been made in dealing with economic equilibrium
models with more than one type of indivisible good. Curiel and Tijs (1985) made
a step forward by studying two classes of transferable utility games, namely, as-
signment games and permutation games in which there are two types of indivisible
goods. They showed that these games may have an empty core but they proved
that these games have a nonempty core in case of additivity and separability. In
this paper we consider an economy in which there are a nite number of agents
and a nite number of dierent types of indivisible goods. We may think of these
dierent types of indivisible goods as houses, cars, trucks, bikes, and so on. Units
of each type of indivisible good are subject to quality dierentiation. For example,
houses belong to one type of indivisible good and have the same function for agents
but may be dierent in quality. Each agent initially owns at most one unit of each
type of indivisible good and a certain amount of money. Agents have preferences
over goods and money with the constraint that no agent desires more than one unit
of each type of indivisible good. We impose rather plausible conditions on demand
in order to guarantee the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the economy.
The assumptions are similar to those as used by Gale (1984) in case of just one
type of indivisible good. We only need boundedness and continuity. Our result also
applies to a model with some kind of externalities5 in the sense that whether or
not an agent prefers a good of some type may depend on the prices of the other
goods of that type or even on the prices of goods of other types. The proof of the
existence of a competitive equilibrium in the economy is based on a generalization
5Strictly speaking, this is not the denition of externalities. Here we follow an explanation of
Gale (1984).
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of the KKM lemma. The results we obtain in this paper generalize those of Gale
and of Curiel and Tijs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic
model. The proof of the equilibrium existence theorem is given in Section 3.
2 The economic model with indivisibilities and
money
We shall consider an exchange economy with n agents and m dierent types of
indivisible goods. Let Ik be the set of the rst k positive integers. We denote
the set of agents and the set of dierent types of indivisible goods by In and Im,
respectively. We assume that each agent initially owns one unit of each type of
indivisible good and some amount of money. Notice that this involves no loss of
generality since if some agent does not own one unit of some type of indivisible good
we may assume that he has a dummy good of that type which is of no value to any
of the agents. We denote that agent i owns one unit of indivisible good of type j by
an ordering pair (j; i). Let ImIn be the set of all indivisible goods in the economy,











+ is represented by p = (p1;    ; pm) where pj = (pj1;    ; pjn) for each
j 2 Im. Let  = f  j  = (1;    ; n) is a permutation of (1;    ; n)g. An element
 2
Qm
h=1 is written as  = (1;    ; m) where j = (j(1);    ; j(n)) for each
j 2 Im. Furthermore, for a positive integer k, let I
k
n denote In      In where In
is repeated k times.
For each i 2 In and each j 2 Im, the demand of agent i for the indivisible good











us give some explanation. If p 2 C
(j;k)
i , this implies that at price p for agent i there
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is no good of type j owned by any other agent rather than agent k to which he
prefers strictly. If p 2 C
(j;0)
i , this means that at price p for agent i there is no good
of type j he prefers above exchanging his good of type j for money.






h=1  is a competitive
equilibrium if it holds that p 2 C
(j;j(i))
i for all j 2 Im and all i 2 In.
From the denition, at an equilibrium each agent obtains one unit of each type of
indivisible good and there are no other goods he prefers strictly. Let Bn denote the
boundary of Rn+. Now we make the following assumptions on the demands:
(A1) The set C
(j;l)
i is closed for any j 2 Im, i 2 In and l 2 In [ f0g;
(A2) For each i 2 In and each j 2 Im, C
(j;1)






(A3) There exists M > 0 such that if pjl M , then p 62 C
(j;l)
k for all k 2 In.
Assumption (A1) says that every agent has a positive amount of money and that
no agent would give up all of his money to buy any good. Assumption (A2) says
that if a price of a good of some type is zero, then every agent demands some good
of that type. Finally Assumption (A3) implies that no agent is willing to spend a
huge amount of money on any good. It should be noted that the above assumptions
are identical to those of Gale (1984) in case of just one type of indivisible good, i.e.,
m = 1.
Now we are ready to state the equilibrium theorem.
Theorem 2.2 Under Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A3), the economy has at






3 The proof of the existence of an equilibrium
We rst introduce some notation. The vector e(i) is the i-th unit vector of Rn for
each i 2 In. The vector e denotes a vector in R
n all of whose components equal 1.
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For each i 2 In, let a
i denote the vector e=n   e(i) in Rn. In order to prove the
equilibrium thorem, we rst generalize the KKM lemma. The (n   1)-dimensional
unit simplex Sn is dened by
Sn = fx 2 Rn+ j
nX
i=1
xi = 1 g:




Theorem 3.1 For each i 2 In and each j 2 Im, let the collection of closed
sets fC
(j;1)
i ;    ; C
(j;n)
i g be a covering of the simplotope S such that if p lies on the
boundary of S then for some k 2 In it holds that p 2 C
(j;k)
i and pjk > 0. Then there
exist  2
Qm
h=1  and p
 2 S such that















i is a closed set, and the collection of sets fC
T
i j T 2 I
m
n g is a
covering of S. Furthermore, it is not dicult to show that if p lies on the boundary
of S then for some T = (i1;    ; im) 2 I
m
n it holds that p 2 C
T
i and pjij > 0 for every
j 2 Im. Now let S denote the set S  S







Clearly, C(i1;;im+1) is a closed set, and the collection of sets fCT j T 2 Im+1n g is a
covering of S. If p lies on the boundary of S then for some T = (i1;    ; im+1) 2 I
m+1
n
it holds that p 2 CT and pjij > 0 for every j 2 Im+1.
For each (i1;    ; im+1) 2 I
m+1





c(i1;;im+1) = (ai1;    ; aim+1):
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Let the set V =
Qm+1
h=1 V
h be given by for h = 1,   , m+ 1,




xhj = 1; xhj   1=n for every j 2 In g:
For x 2 V the point p(x) is dened as the projection of x on S, i.e., p(x) =
(p1(x);    ; pm+1(x)) with the projection ph(x) of xh in V








xhl if xhj  0:





F (x) = Conv(f c(i1;;im+1) j p(x) 2 C(i1;;im+1) and xjij  0 for every j 2 Im+1g);
where Conv(D) denotes the convex hull of a set D. It is easy to see that F is upper
semi-continuous. Moreover, [x2VF (x) is compact, and for each x 2 V the set F (x)




containing [x2VF (x). Then we dene the point-to-set mapping G from Y to the
collection of subsets of V by
G(y) = fx 2 V j x>h yh  (x

h)
>yh for all xh 2 V
h and h 2 Im+1g:
Again, G is upper semi-continuous. Moreover, for any y 2 Y the set G(y) is
nonempty, compact and convex and [y2YG(y) is bounded. For (x; y) 2 V  Y , let
(x; y) be dened as
(x; y) = G(y) F (x);
then  is an upper semi-continuous mapping from the set V Y into the collection
of nonempty subsets of V Y satisfying for every (x; y) 2 V Y that the set (x; y)
is nonempty, convex and compact. According to Kakutani's xed point theorem,
there exists an (x; y) 2 V  Y such that
x 2 G(y) and y 2 F (x):
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for every xh 2 V
h and h 2 Im+1. Let h be equal to (x

h)
>yh. Then by taking xh




hj = 0 for any h 2 Im+1. When we
take xh succesively equal to e(j) for every j 2 In, we obtain
yhj  h; for every h 2 Im+1 and j 2 In:
On the other hand, if for some h 2 Im+1 and j 2 In it holds that x

hj >  1=n, by




h   e(j)) for arbitrarily small  > 0, we obtain that
yhj  h. Hence y

hj = h  0 when x

hj >  1=n.
Let the collection T  of elements of Im+1n be dened by
T  = fT = (i1;    ; im+1) 2 I
m+1
n j p(x
) 2 CT and xjij  0 for every j 2 Im+1g:
Suppose that T  = fT 1;    ; T l g, where T k = (ik1;    ; i
k
m+1). Since y
 2 F (x)






Suppose that xhj =  1=n for some h 2 Im+1 and j 2 In. Then it implies that j 6= i
k
h




hj = 0 for any h 2 Im+1, we




T k = 0: (3.1)
Now for each k 2 Im, dene




m+1) j h = 1;    ; l g:


















(i;j) = 1=n. From this property it





(i; j) 2 Sk and 
k
(i;j) = 0 if (i; j) 62 Sk is a doubly stochastic matrix and therefore
U(k) is a convex combination of permutation matrices according to the theorem of
Birkho and von Neumann. So, there exists a permutation k = (k(1);    ; k(n))
of (1;    ; n) such that k(k(j);j) > 0 and hence (k(j); j) 2 Sk for every j 2 In. Since
p(x) 2 \lh=1C





















k+1(k);    ; i
j
m(k); j) 2 T
 for every k 2 Im and














This completes the proof. 2
We note that the intersection lemma of Gale (1984) follows from Theorem 3.1
by setting m = 1. The intersection lemma of Gale implies the KKM lemma. Now
we are ready to derive Theorem 2.2.
Proof of Theorem 2.2: Without loss of generality, we take M = 1 for Assump-
tion (A3). Let An be the intersection of Bn and the unit n-cube Un. We shall
construct a homeomorphism  from
Qm
h=1A
n into S such that for each j 2 Im
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and i 2 In, the collection f (C
(j;k)
i ) j k 2 In g is a covering of S satisfying
the boundary condition of Theorem 3.1. Then the result immediately follows
from Theorem 3.1. For p = (p1;    ; pm) 2
Qm
h=1A
n the point  (p) is dened as
 (p) = ( 1(p1);    ;  m(pm)) where  h is a homeomorphism from A
n into Sn for
each h 2 Im. For each h 2 Im, the mapping  h is constructed as follows. For each
permutation  = (i1; i2;    ; in) of (1;    ; n) we dene a subset A
 of An by
A = f ph 2 A
n j ph;i1  phi2  :::  phin = 0 g
and dene a subset S of Sn by
S = fxh 2 S
n jxhi1  xhi2      xhin g:
We then dene  h from A
 to S by













n   k + 1
;
for k 2 In n f1g. It is easy to see that
Pn
k=1( h(ph))hik = 1, and ( h(ph))hik  0 for
any k. Moreover, ph 6= p
0
h implies  h(ph) 6=  h(p
0
h). Now take xh 2 S
. We have
xhi1  xhi2      xhin :
Notice that we have
phi1 = 1  nxhi1
and
phik = phik 1   (n  k + 1)(xhik   xhik 1);
for k 2 In n f1g. It follows that ph 2 A
. Observe that   1h (e(j)) = e  e(j) and
  1h (fxh 2 S
n j xhj = 0g) = f ph 2 A
n j phj = 1 g:
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By Assumption (A3) C
(j;k)
i does not meet  
 1(fx 2 S j xjk = 0g). This implies
that  (C
(j;k)
i ) does not meet fx 2 S j xjk = 0 g for any i 2 In, j 2 Im, and k 2 In.
Hence it follows that if x is on the boundary of S then for some k 2 In it holds that
x 2  (C
(j;k)
i ) and xjk > 0. So, the boundary condition of Theorem 3.1 is fullled.
We obtain the equilibrium theorem. 2
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